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Internet e-commerce
? Focus of this talk is security issues for 
e-commerce payments made across 
the Internet.
? In other words the talk focuses on 
security issues for b2c (business to 
consumer) e-commerce.
? This is a rapidly growing method for 
buying goods and services, despite 
end of ‘dot com’ boom. 
Payment methods
? There are a variety of possible 
methods for making payments across 
the Internet.
? Methods include:
? debit/credit cards;
? bank transfers/cheques;
? third party payment services (e.g. 
Paypal).
Credit card payments
? The ‘standard’ payment model for 
credit card payments involves four 
parties:
? Cardholder;
?Merchant;
? Issuing bank (issuer of card);
? Acquiring bank (relationship with 
merchant).
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Security threats
? Number of security threats to this payment 
model when merchant & cardholder interact via 
the Internet, including:
? impersonation of cardholder using stolen credit 
card details;
? theft of credit card details when sent via 
Internet;
? theft of credit card details at merchant;
? manipulation of transaction details during 
transmission across Internet;
? manipulation of transaction details at Merchant.
Security techniques – what 
we have today
? On-line transaction authorisation at 
merchant (prevents use of stolen cards);
? CVC value printed on card (designed to 
make use of stolen card details harder);
? Use of SSL/TLS to protect 
cardholder/merchant link (and 
authenticate merchant).
Areas not covered
? Credit card details held in cleartext on 
merchant server.
? No cardholder authentication – hence 
if cardholder repudiates transaction 
then merchant loses (no cover for 
‘cardholder not present’ transactions).
? No protection for transaction details 
except on cardholder/merchant link.
EMV
? EMV (for Europay-MasterCard-Visa) is a set 
of specifications for smart card/terminal 
interactions.
? EMV-compliant credit cards now being 
rolled out in UK.
? EMV not really designed to protect e-
commerce.
? Designed to reduce fraud and reduce 
number of online authorisations 
(expensive).
SSL/TLS
? Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) – and 
the similar Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) – provide security for an 
Internet communications link.
? TLS is commonly used to protect e-
commerce transactions against 
Internet eavesdroppers.
Residual security risks
? SSL/TLS does not protect data once it 
reaches the merchant server.
? SSL/TLS does not provide cardholder 
authentication.
? Although SSL/TLS provides merchant 
authentication, this is not foolproof, as 
it relies on the cardholder checking 
displayed web pages.
SET – a complete solution?
? In mid-1990s, Visa and MasterCard agreed on SET 
(Secure Electronic Transaction) specifications.
? SET provides ‘complete’ protection for e-commerce 
transactions.
? Bidirectional authentication, encryption of card 
details at merchant server, privacy of transaction 
details from acquirer bank, transaction integrity 
protection, …
? SET transactions regarded as ‘cardholder present’
transactions.
Why has SET failed?
? Despite dealing with all security 
threats, and protecting merchants 
against losses, SET has not been 
adopted to any significant extent.
? Number of reasons:
? Cost for merchants;
? Complexity of cardholder initialisation;
? Lack of cardholder mobility, …
SET extensions
? Various SET ‘extensions’ have been 
introduced to try to promote SET 
adoption.
? PIN extensions allow cardholder 
authentication via a card PIN.
? Chip extensions allow use of an EMV 
card to avoid need for SET 
initialisation process.
Other solutions
? Despite the best efforts of Visa and 
MasterCard, SET now seems doomed 
to failure.
? Other approaches to the 
enhancement of e-commerce security 
being tried.
? Still not clear what will happen in long 
run.
3-D Secure
? One recently devised approach being 
promoted by Visa.
? One of a number of ‘3 domain’ solutions.
? Instead of requiring cardholder and 
merchant to provide secure payment 
functionality, servers provided by issuer and 
acquirer perform functions on behalf of end-
players.
? Servers interact with interoperability (brand) 
server – hence ‘3 domains’.
M-commerce solutions
? Other possible approaches to secure 
Internet payments operate via mobile 
networks (or with support of mobile 
networks).
? Promising because mobile networks 
already have means for end-user 
authentication, and mobiles rapidly 
becoming ubiquitous.
Electronic cash
? Other solutions rely on payment 
methods other than credit card.
? One family of solutions involves 
storing value on smart cards.
? Such e-cash already in use in variety 
of countries, and can also potentially 
be used for e-commerce transactions.
Where next?
? Long term solution to security for b2c 
e-commerce still very unclear.
? Probably will involve a combination of 
different payment models.
? 3-D solutions seem promising for 
debit/credit payments.
? M-commerce solutions also appear 
likely.
